The Doctrine Of Administrative Decision Maker - 1026 Words

Mason CJ in Quin endorsed Gummow J’s statement of law (extracted directly above), with one exclusion that an administrative decision maker cannot be estopped in the circumstances so as to fetter a statutory discretion or require an ultra vires act. His Honour said: ‘[the] availability of estoppel against the Executive, arising from conduct amounting to a representation, when holding the Executive to its representation does not significantly hinder the exercise of the relevant discretion in the public interest. And, as the public interest necessarily comprehends an element of justice to the individual, one cannot exclude the possibility that the courts might in some situations grant relief on the basis that a refusal to hold the†¦show more content†¦Ltd. v. Whitfeld [1919] HCA 69; (1919) 27 CLR 268, at p 277; Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth [1977] HCA 71; (1977) 139 CLR 54, at pp 74-76; Malvaso v. The Queen (1989) 64 ALJR 44, at p 47; 89 ALR 34, at p 37; Birkdale District Electric Supply Co. v. Southport Corporation (1926) AC 355, at p 364; Cudgen Rutile (No. 2) Ltd. v. Chalk (1975) AC 520, at pp 533-534; Southend-on-Sea Corporation v. Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd. (1962) 1 QB 416, at pp 423-425; W estern Fish Products Ltd. v. Penwith District Council [1978] EWCA Civ 6; (1981) 2 All ER 204. Accordingly, it has been said that a public authority ... cannot be estopped from doing its public duty, to use the words of Lord Denning M.R. in Lever Finance v. Westminster London Borough Council (1971) 1 QB 222, at p 230. See also Rootkin v. Kent County Council (1981) 1 WLR 1186; (1981) 2 All ER 227.’ Despite the fact that the judgements of Gummow J in Kurtovic and Mason CJ in Quin allows for the prospects of estoppel to develop in public law, the courts since have generally not departed from the traditional rule. Mason CJ’s views in Quin have been discussed in several